Sociological and Political Constraints of Islamic Sharia Enforcement in South Sulawesi Indonesia

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Abstract: The objective of this study is to examine the challenges encountered by Islamic Sharia Enforcement Committee in South Sulawesi by analyzing the responses of charismatic ulama. Qualitative methods, such as observation, interviews, and documentation, were employed to conduct a descriptive and critical analysis. The result showed that the primary obstacle to the wider acceptance of the idea lies in the sociological rejection of ulama. Ulama opposed the plan due to their epistemological understanding of Sharia and strategic approach to advocating it within the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). Politically, they gave a substantive and cultural notion instead of formalistic and structural discourse because there are no circumstances in South Sulawesi that may force the state to grant special autonomy like in Aceh. The contemporary thinking of ulama is shaped by education and practical experience, enabling them to consider contextual factors openly. The views of the Indonesian ulama on implementing Islamic Sharia are influenced by political failures, genuine religious beliefs, and political accommodations made to address Muslim aspirations. Furthermore, the results showed a decreasing trend in the scripturalist-formalistic approach to enforcing Islamic Sharia, while the substantialistic tendency is growing in popularity.

Keywords: Rejection of Ulama; Sociological Constraint; Political Constraint; Islamic Sharia Enforcement; Preparatory Committee for Enforcement of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI)

Introduction

The inability to achieve enforcement of Sharia, as pursued by the Preparatory Committee for Enforcement of Islamic Sharia (KPPSI) in South Sulawesi, signifies the presence of numerous obstacles in the struggle for Sharia implementation. These obstacles extend beyond epistemological challenges and encompass sociological and political aspects. Since the inception of the discourse in 2000, the response from the local Muslim community has been characterized by polarization and diverse trends. While some people support it, others reject the idea, and some accept it with certain conditions and substantive considerations (van Bruinessen, 2018). The fact that even charismatic ulama are unable to provide unequivocal support further hinders the progress of Sharia enforcement model by KPPSI. Despite two decades of discourse, the advancement of KPPSI struggle has not gained strength but has instead weakened (Mujiburrahman, 2013). Unlike regions like Aceh, which have become well-known for their efforts in Sharia enforcement, South Sulawesi has encountered significant difficulties in its struggle. The lack of political backing from the state (Buehler, 2016) is a critical factor in limiting the struggle to a mere discourse. The rejection of this idea by ulama, who are considered part of the elite Muslim community (Nurlaila & Zulihafnani, 2019), is surprising, given the longstanding history of support for Sharia implementation by the country.

Existing studies on the struggle for Sharia enforcement have primarily focused on the actors and organizations driving the movement, as well as the associated consequences. However, it is crucial also to consider the perspective of charismatic clerics, as it significantly influences the support of the Muslim
community. The viewpoint of ulama deserves attention due to two key observed trends. Firstly, many studies have examined the actors and motivations behind the emergence of movements advocating for enforcing Islamic law (Azis, 2016; Juhannis, 2007; Karsono, 2018). For instance, Hamdan stated that KPPSI received support from former DI/TII loyalists and young activists who expressed dissatisfaction with Western attitudes towards Islam. Secondly, preliminary studies primarily focused on the obstacles encountered when implementing Islamic law (H, 2019; Agustiansyah, 2019; Syarifuddin, 2011). Agustiansyah (2019) stated that enforcing Islamic law in Southeast Aceh still needs to grow, while Syarifuddin (2011) extensively elaborated on criticisms of Qanun for a long period (Nurdin & Ridwansyah, 2020). Ali Geno outlined the challenges the government and the community faced when implementing Qanun in Aceh (Berutu, 2017; Zada et al., 2022; Zada, 2023). Metaphorically, Amin Suma (2018) referred to Islamic law as both longed for and despised. However, existing studies have neglected the views and attitudes of ulama, who are considered the elite of society. The support or the rejection of ulama ideas directly determines the success or failure of advocating for these religious concepts. It is no exaggeration to say that the future of enforcement of Islamic law anywhere is determined by the support of ulama.

This study addressed a gap in existing studies by examining the rejection of the formalistic Sharia idea proposed by KPPSI model among ulama in South Sulawesi. The rejection issue is directly tied to the epistemology of thought, as understanding the fundamental principles of Islamic thought regarding Sharia in the contemporary context is crucial. As an elite religious group in Sulawesi, the rejection of ulama regarding Sharia ideas by KPPSI will undoubtedly influence the views of the Muslim community. This study outlined the response of ulama to this idea and delved into the main reasons behind their withdrawal of support for this particular model of Sharia. A deep understanding of the rejection will provide solutions and lessons to prepare action plans for the struggle for Islamic Sharia enforcement in Indonesia.

This study posits that the rejection of ulama towards implementing Islamic Sharia, specifically within the framework of KPPSI, is influenced by epistemological factors and socio-political circumstances. The refusal reflects a transformation in ideology and signifies the prevailing sentiment among Muslims regarding strict adherence to formal Islamic Sharia principles.

Literature Review

The Origins and Objectives of the Preparatory KPPSI Struggle

KPPSI started its struggle during the First Congress of Muslims, which took place from 19 to 21 October 2000 in Makassar, South Sulawesi. According to KPPSI, Muslims became a marginalized group with the origination of the New Order. Therefore, the fall of the New Order in 1998 was necessary to create the right momentum for the revival of Muslims. In pursuit of this goal, KPPSI aimed to establish an institution dedicated to consistently pursuing Islamic law enforcement in the region (Fawaid, 2016).

The proponents and supporters of KPPSI affirm that Islam has been the religion of the kings and citizens of South Sulawesi, leading to the title “Veranda of Medina” (Abdullah, 2016). Therefore, they argued that the historical background of the region necessitates the formal enforcement of Islamic law (Karsono, 2018). R26, the Chairman of Lajnah Tanfidziyah KPPSI, mentioned in an interview that this idea stemmed from political granting of Special Autonomy status for enforcing Islamic law in Aceh (R26, interview). The establishment of a similar committee in Aceh served as an example for South Sulawesi (Mujiburrahman, 2013). Furthermore, philosophical and sociological reasons also drove the desire to enforce Islamic law (Faisal, 2017; Juhannis, 2017). The perceived ineffectiveness of the existing system in resolving various problems further underscored the need for a new implementation.

The agenda of KPPSI encompasses two main demands, namely (1) the establishment of special autonomy for enforcement of Islamic law in South Sulawesi and (2) the implementation of a kaffah or total manner (van Bruinessen, 2018). KPPSI proponents argued that realizing their demands required a clear legal foundation capable of recognizing the authority to enforce Islamic law in the region. They emphasized the importance of establishing a legal framework that substantiates their demand for enforcement (legal standing) in the area.
According to Tajuddin et al. (2019), even though proponents of KPPSI acknowledged that certain aspects of Sharia law had been implemented and incorporated into regulations, their analysis described the state as ambiguous. This is because it has provided opportunities for applying Islam in areas such as family law and other matters of personal privacy. However, the accommodation of Islamic criminal law in public legislation has not been maximally accommodated. KPPSI only acknowledged enforcing Islamic law when all aspects are applied (Faisal, 2019), advocating for a comprehensive implementation known as kaffah.

**Enforcement of Islamic Sharia from Various Perspectives**

The issue of Sharia enforcement gave rise to two distinct schools of thought. Although both recognized the relevance of Sharia principles in all aspects of life, their views on the applicability of Islamic teachings to modern life are vastly different. One group of Muslims maintains that Sharia must be acknowledged as a comprehensive way of life, necessitating the responsibility of state to ensure its implementation through explicit norms. Conversely, another group argues that the practice of universal values derived from Sharia, such as justice, equality, and freedom (al-qiyyâm al-asâsiyah), holds sufficient weight even without formal legalization by the state. Such practices denote adherence to Sharia and preclude the formality of explicit state provisions (Faisal, 2019; Misbahuddin et al., 2023).

The degree of emphasis on the extent and nature of legally recognized Sharia varies among different perspectives. Within the Muslim academic community, some believe that Sharia embodies the concept of law like the Western understanding, despite differences in its sources (Salim, 2008). According to this viewpoint, the formal implementation of Sharia within a contemporary nation-state is considered reasonable, as it aligns with the Western notion of legal systems. However, some argue that applying Sharia requires a established state to be a legitimate operator of Islamic law. Sharia necessitates the presence of an established state that can legitimately serve as the authority for Islamic law.

Enforcement of Sharia entails the practical application of Islamic teachings within social life (Zulfadli et al., 2020; Agus, 2016). This implementation is achieved by formulating legal products that align with the ideological foundations of each respective country or society (Jati, 2013). In this case, the understanding of Islamic Sharia is closely intertwined with these legal products, which inherently possess political dimension, as they are shaped by the underlying political framework (Almakhzoumi et al., 2021). Islamic Sharia encompasses legal aspects and moral and spiritual dimensions, serving as a comprehensive framework for a restorative justice system (Sodiqin, 2021). Therefore, its enforcement can be seen as a regime or system that guides the treatment of individuals within a society (Bakibinga-Gaswaga, 2021). The enforcer of Sharia is typically a party directly involved in its implementation (Azhar et al., 2020). Enforcement of Islamic Sharia represents a regulatory or policy process undertaken by a society or state (Yucel & Albayrak, 2021).

Law enforcement comprises three key elements: the legal structure (officers), legal culture, and legal substance (Ras et al., 2021). In Indonesian society, there is a general attitude of distrust and skepticism towards enforcing Islamic law, primarily due to ongoing debates among law enforcement entities that have raised doubts about its correctness (Munawwir et al., 2021). For instance, the three community organizations rejected the conversion of the caliphate to a state system. Nahdathul Ulama (NU) refused because of its alignment with extremism, while Muhammadiyah rejected the idea but accepted the caliphate as a culture. Conversely, Nahdatul Wathon (NW) rejected the proposition because it contradicted the republican system and was considered similar to the royal system (Suhirman, 2021). These differing stances signify that enforcing Islamic Sharia encompasses elements capable of serving as a basis for policymaking decisions.

**Ulama (Anre Gurutta) in the Muslim Community in South Sulawesi**

The term ulama in Indonesia is described using various terms, such as Tengku (Aceh), Buya (West Sumatra), Ajengan (West Java), Kiayi (Central Java and East Java), Tuan Guru (West Nusa Tenggara), Qadhi (Gorontalo), and Anre Gurutta (South Sulawesi). Particularly in South Sulawesi, the categorization of ulama consists of ustadz, gurutta, and Anre Gurutta (Siagian et al., 2014). Anre Gurutta refers to ulama with the
highest degree, whose strong characters are recognized by ulama, the community, and the government, because of their knowledge, piety, obedience, commendable attitude, behaviour (Husnan & Sholihin, 2017), and even lineage (Darmawan, 2018). Generally, a district consists of only 1 or 2 ulama with the Anre Gurutta degree. The popularity of this degree goes beyond the boundaries of the domicile and extends to other regions or districts.

In society, Anre Gurutta and ulama hold significant influence in religious, moral, as well as educational matters (Othman, 1998). According to Thadi & Damayanti (2021) these terms often act as mediators of modernization, development, and change (Husnan & Sholihin, 2017). Therefore, they are considered preachers, advisors, guides, and educators (MZ Abidin, 2018; Ichwan, 2011). As an esteemed and influential group, ulama possess authority in the legislative process, including the ability to issue fatwas and provide input on policies established by the government. The resistance or rejection within a system arises when there is a perceived threat to established values. This threat can stem from perceptions or understandings that promote change (Harun, 2020). Therefore, ulama can reject policies to preserve and safeguard the existing values within a country (Bunza, 2014).

**Method**

This study employed a study method that involved semi-structured and multiple informal conversational interviews (Roberts, 2010; Hughes et al., 2010). The interviews were conducted both face-to-face and remotely throughout 2019. The key informants for the study consisted of twenty-five (25) charismatic ulama/kiai in South Sulawesi who held the title of Anre Gurutta (AG). By examining the perspectives of these Anre Gurutta, a comprehensive understanding of the Muslim community was constructed. These Anre Gurutta were chosen as representative figures of the local-authoritative Muslim scholars.

Methodologically, the Anre Gurutta participated in the study interviews to obtain further information regarding their thoughts and feelings towards preserving Sharia KPPSI model. They were purposeful and represented teachers in every district and city across South Sulawesi and figures and leaders from mass organizations, Islamic boarding schools, as well as the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia - MUI). Some KPPSI officials were also interviewed to discover their fundamental of struggle tenets and goals.

In addition to the in-depth interviews, a comprehensive approach to data collection was adopted, incorporating observation, literature studies, and documentation. The collected data were carefully examined, reviewed, and analyzed. Multiple methods were employed to present the findings. The interviews were transcribed, and relevant data were extracted using quotations, contextualizations, and interpretations to construct a critical narrative. The analytical process involved describing, explaining, comparing, and interpreting the data to understand the phenomenon under study comprehensively. Drawing on the framework proposed by Huberman and Miles, the data analysis followed three stages: reduction, presentation, and verification (Williamson et al., 2018).

**Results and Discussion**

**The Rejection of Ulama of Arguments against KPPSI Model of Islamic Sharia Enforcement**

The rejection of KPPSI model of sharia enforcement among ulama was based on three key points shown in Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No</th>
<th>Arguments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Repeated failures in political arena</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Development of religion that is beneficial to the Muslim people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>State politics that is more accommodating to the aspirations of Muslims</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Political history of Islam in modern Indonesia has been characterized by a series of challenges and setbacks rather than a focus on appeasing its supporters (Gaffar, 1993). For instance, both the Soekarno and Suharto governments viewed political Islam as a dangerous phenomenon that could disrupt power dynamics and challenge the ideology and foundations of the state. Consequently, these governments sought to weaken and control political Islam (Kohar, 2017).

The state adopted a general perspective that classified Islamic politics as belonging to minority groups or external entities (McVey, 1983). Initially, when Islam intersected with politics in modern Indonesia, the ideas and practices put forth by intellectuals and activists were heavily influenced by legalistic and formalistic nuances. Consequently, establishing a meaningful connection between Islam and politics became challenging (Latief & Jandra, 2016). During the long reign of the New Order government, Islamic politics, seen as conflicting with political mainstream, were marginalized and subjected to restrictions (Indra et al., 2021).

This uncomfortable situation prompted numerous Islamic activists and thinkers to develop a new political framework in the 1970s. The theological foundations of Islamic politics aimed to present the religion in its most objective form, considering the diverse socio-religious environment of Indonesia. The objective was to transform the particularistic subjectivity of Islam and neutralize perceived threats. This shift led to new theological foundations, aspirations, and political approaches. During this period, efforts were focused on developing the substantive content and concrete meaning of Islamic politics, while symbolic-ideological nuances were overlooked. Consequently, there were changes in the ideals and aspirations, as well as the methods, tools, and instruments employed within the traditional Islamic political framework to achieve their goals (Murniati, 2015).

Ulama interviewed were of the opinion that legal protection and special autonomy for Sharia enforcement should not be prioritized as the main solution to address the current needs of the people. According to AGH. Sanusi Baco, a central figure of NU in South Sulawesi, the immediate focus should be on resolving more concrete problems, such as poverty and the low quality of education, rather than pursuing formalization (AGH. Sanusi Baco, interview). He emphasized that Muslims could learn from the history of struggles for formalistic Sharia enforcement, as it yielded more failures than successes.

AGH. Farid Wadjidi stated that Sharia enforcement should be fostered through awareness rather than coercion. As a representative of Darul Dakwah wal-Isyad (DDI) in South Sulawesi, he emphasized the need for systematic and planned efforts to address various issues based on Sharia principles. The goal was for people to naturally recognize the importance of implementing Sharia in their lives rather than through forced formalization (AGH. Farid Wadjidi, interview).

Another respondent, AGH. Tahir Syarkawi argued against comparing the special autonomy granted to Aceh as a linear argument. As a cleric who previously served as Kakanwil of the Ministry of Religion in South Sulawesi and Southeast Sulawesi, he highlighted that granting special autonomy to Aceh was primarily political accommodation to address the long-standing conflict between the Free Aceh Movement and the government. Due to the nonexistence of a similar situation in South Sulawesi, it was highly unlikely that the state would implement the same approach there. AGH. Tahir Syarkawi also reminded KPPSI supporters of the broad accommodations made by the state to fulfil the aspirations of Muslims. The state partially facilitated the development of religion, including the freedom for Muslims to express their values openly without pressure and the availability of mosques and religious schools. (AGH. Tahir Syarkawi, interview).

The rejection of KPPSI model by ulama was attributed to the growing inclination of state politics towards accommodating the aspirations of people. Over time, as the relationship between Islam and the state improved, various policies were formulated to align with the socio-cultural, economic, and political preferences of the Muslim community. These policies included ratifying the National Education Law in 1989, which made religious lessons compulsory at all levels of public and private schools. The Law on Religious Courts, also ratified in 1989, established regulations regarding divorce, marriage, reconciliation,
inheritance, and waqf based on Islamic principles. The establishment of the Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals Association (ICMI) in 1990, the Compilation of Islamic Law in 1991, and the issuance of a Joint Ministerial Decree to regulate zakat administrations through Bazis in the same year were further steps taken to accommodate Islamic values. Permissibility was granted for female high school students to wear the hijab in 1991, and the Istiqlal Festival, held in 1991 and 1995, provided a platform for celebrating Islamic culture. The establishment of Bank Muamalat Indonesia (BMI) in 1992 and the closure of the SDSB practice in 1993 were additional initiatives aligned with Islamic principles. The issuance of the Law on Hajj in 1999 and the existence of the Law on Zakat in the same year further demonstrated the implementation of Islamic-inclined policies by the state. Moreover, the ratification of Law no. 44/1999 on the Implementation of the Privileges of the Aceh Province and Law no. 18/2001 NAD, which pertained to the implementation of Islamic law through Sharia Court in Aceh, reflected the recognition of Acehnese culture and religion (Din & Abubakar, 2021).

The enactment of Law No. 2/1999 on Regional Autonomy by the government also allowed regions to introduce local regulations with religious elements. For instance, Bulukumba’s local regulations No. 03/2002 on alcohol, No. 02/2003 on Professional Zakat, No. 05/2003 on Muslimah Clothing, and No. 06/2003 on reading and writing the Qur’an for students and prospective brides exemplified the adoption of religious bylaws in various Muslim-majority regions (Kholiludin, 2020).

AGH. Nasaruddin Umar suggested that these policies were achievable due to the improved relationship between Islam and the state, increasing Muslim representation and influence in government and legislative bodies. The accommodation of the interests of Muslims in state policies reflected the positive outcomes of this integrative approach, as evidenced by the historical terms Islamization of the bureaucracy and ijo royo-royo. (AGH. Nasaruddin Umar, interview).

Factors Influencing the Rejection of Ulama to Uphold KPPSI Sharia Model

Two key factors influenced the rejection of the formal enforcement of Sharia by ulama. Firstly, their birth dates fell between the 1930s and 1950s, which meant they did not directly experience the struggle for sharia enforcement during the 1940s to 1960s. Secondly, ulama received their education primarily through traditional pesantren, supplemented by Islamic Higher Education system developed by the Ministry of Religion. This educational background exposed them to a critical academic environment that encouraged a broader and more open-minded approach. Consequently, they possessed the ability to critically reassess and redefine their political ideas in a more realistic manner. The educational data of the Kiai is shown in Table 2.

Table 2. The detail of ulama according to education in South Sulawesi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of Education</th>
<th>Ulama Polarization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro KPPSI</td>
<td>Contra KPPSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>Frequency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Elementary</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School/Equivalent</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Junior High</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School/Equivalent</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School/Equivalent</td>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>Education/Equivalent</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, 2023.

These findings revealed the orientation and educational background of ulama, showing a shift from their previous involvement in entrepreneurship, agriculture, and trade, which had served as the
foundation for their economic and political influence. According to the data shown in Table 3, 68% of the well-educated participants were employed as bureaucrats or civil servants.

Table 3. Details of the segmentation of ulama’ professions in South Sulawesi

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Profession</th>
<th>Ulama Polarization</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pro KPPSI</td>
<td>Contra KPPSI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government employees</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: The authors, 2023.

This study challenges the presumed positive relationship between changes in education orientation, job choices, and the response of ulama to enforcement of Islamic law in South Sulawesi. It examines the relationship between a distinguished civil servant position and the reduced commitment to upholding Islamic law.

According to Geertz, government employees have a distinct professional identity compared to ulama involved in trade and farming. This distinction creates variations in their behavior patterns within social and political spheres, ultimately shortening the social and cultural distance between bureaucrats and other ulama (William & Geertz, 1961).

The reduced cultural gap between these two Muslim social groups, coupled with bureaucratic socialization among ulama, gradually diminished their allegiance to traditional Islamic views and ideologies historically associated with opposition and dissent. Consequently, their thinking became more open, practical, accommodating, and cooperative towards various social, cultural, and political policies that lacked direct doctrinal or theological connections to religious beliefs. Political mindset of ulama shifted from a primordial and emotional standpoint to a more receptive and functional attitude.

The changing patterns in social, economic, and political spheres integrated political struggle as a component of the da’wah movement, which aimed to achieve the goals of Islamic struggle. Aligned with the philosophy and framework of the da’wah movement, which emphasized a socio-cultural and functional approach to societal construction, the conflicts between ulama and Muslims regarding government policies were diminished. The prevailing myth that portrayed ulama as a traditional and rigid group also began to lose credibility (Mulkhan, 2004). Consequently, political sentiments could no longer serve as a unifying factor or generate mass support, as such ideologies failed to fulfil the social and political needs of Muslims. These shifts in the thoughts of ulama regarding enforcement of Islamic law should be seen in connection with the development of socialization, theological thinking, and da’wah practices among ulama (MH Abidin, 2019).

Political perspectives of ulama concerning enforcement of Islamic law should not solely rely on their allegiance to specific political parties or groups. Instead, their thoughts and actions should create social and cultural conditions embodying Islamic values. However, it is important to note that these efforts do not need to be exclusively labelled as Islam.

Based on this functional approach, the choice of ulama to adopt a more open and practical view in addressing social and political issues did not imply a loss of their theological commitment (Ja’far, 2012). This shift was particularly significant when the objective of the struggle questioned legal frameworks, such as the highly formalistic and inflexible fiqh, which was yet to address the underlying philosophy of law creation.
Conclusion

In conclusion, the charismatic ulama in South Sulawesi showed a comprehensive sociological and political understanding of the challenges associated with continuing the struggle to enforce KPPSI sharia model. They acknowledged that Islamic Sharia does not require a rigid and formalistic model, as it has previously led to resistance against the state. Instead, they advocated for a substantive, cooperative, and accommodating approach towards state policies.

The shift in thinking among ulama was due to the repeated failures in politics and the limited progress in developing a religion that effectively addressed the aspirations of Muslims. It is crucial to note that their rejection of certain ideas was not driven by hatred or ignorance but arose from their deep love for Islam and a thorough comprehension of the strategies required to advocate for Sharia in the current and contemporary context.

This study sheds new light on the ongoing struggle for Sharia in the natural and modern world. Previous organized efforts may have faced numerous obstacles and limitations, mainly due to the significant differences in the current scenario compared to earlier generations. Consequently, Muslims must redefine and reformulate their presence and political position to remain relevant amidst new and radical developments. This study emphasized that the opposition of ulama to KPPSI sharia model does not hinder the pursuit of implementing Islamic law. Instead, it strengthens the cause and places it within the context of Islam and Indonesian identity (ke-Indonesia-an). It is important to acknowledge that the findings of this study were based solely on interviews with charismatic kiai in South Sulawesi, limiting their use as a comprehensive basis for national policy development.

Further study should be conducted to establish a constitutional policy formula that builds upon a more in-depth understanding of Sharia enforcement in contemporary Indonesia. Such studies, involving a broader sample and diverse sources of information, would contribute to more comprehensive knowledge and better implementation of Sharia.

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Conflict of Interest

The authors reported no potential conflict of interest.

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